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Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run Value? 
Abstract 
Critics often argue that institutional investors have an excessive focus on short-term firm 
performance that leads corporate managers to make decisions to boost short-term earnings at the 
expense of long-run value. This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit 
preferences for near-term earnings over long-run value and whether such preferences have 
implications for firms' stock prices. Using the Ohlson [ 1995] model, I separate firm value into 
three components-book value, expected near-term earnings, and expected long-term (terminal) 
value-and test whether institutions prefer firms for which more of firm value is expected to be 
realized as near-term earnings rather than as long-term earnings. The results indicate that the 
level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (transient institutions) and by 
institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (banks) is positively (negatively) associated with 
the amount of value in near-term (long-term) earnings. This evidence indicates that institutions 
with the strongest incentives to favor firms with a high proportion of value in near-term earnings 
exhibit such preferences. 
This evidence that banks and transient institutions prefer near-term earnings over long-
run value raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting 
short-term earnings potential and underweighting long-term earnings potential. Evidence of such 
myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure 
managers into a short-term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership 
by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are 
associated with an over- (under-) weighting of near-term (long-term) expected earnings and a 
trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding 
supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an 
ownership base dominated by short-term-focused institutional investors. 
I. Introduction 
A recurrent claim cited throughout the popular press and academic literature is that 
institutional investors have a myopic focus on short-term firm performance that leads corporate 
managers to make operational and accounting decisions to boost short-term earnings at the 
expense of long-run value (see, e.g. Jacobs [1991], Porter [1992], and Lav erty [1996]). This 
paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for expected near-term 
earnings at the expense of expected long-run value and whether such preferences have any 
implications for the relative weighting of these components in fltms' stock prices. A finding of 
institutional preferences for near-term earnings would provide evidence in support of the claim 
that managers feel pressure from institutions to myopically maximize near-term earnings. Such 
evidence would also raise the question of whether institutions myopically price firms , 
overweighting short-term earnings potential and underweighting long-term earnings potential. 
Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors 
could pressure managers into a short-term focus. 
Prior work has tested for institutional investor myopia with respect to near-term earnings 
by examining the relation between institutional trading and contemporaneous earnings news, 
finding a positive association (Lang and McNichols [1997], Eames [1998]). Because current 
earnings news has implications for longer-term earnings, it is difficult to determine from this 
approach whether institutions are reacting to current earnings per se or to the long-run 
implications of current earnings. To separate out preferences for near-term earnings from 
preferences for long-run value, I use a v aluation model based on Ohlson [1995] that segregates 
flrm value into components (book value, near-term earnings, long-run value) based on when the 
value will be realized through earnings. Using this decomposition, I can test for whether 
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institutions prefer firms with more value to be realized through near-term earnings rather than 
through long-term earnings. If a firm' s institutional ownership is focused on expected earnings 
in the next few years, then the manager of that firm may have strong incentives to make 
decisions to meet or exceed that expected performance, even ifthe choices harm long-run value. 
After controlling for numerous factors known to be important in determining the level of 
institutional ownership, I fmd that institutions as a whole have weak preferences for near-term 
earnings at the expense of long-term earnings, providing limited evidence in support of 
institutional investor myopia. However, disaggregating institutional investors into groups based 
on their incentives to prefer short-term earnings reveals significant heterogeneity in institutional 
preferences for the distribution of firm value. I fmd that the level of ownership by institutions 
with short investment horizons (''transient" institutions) and by institutions that are held to the 
most stringent fiduciary standards (bank trusts) is positively associated with the amount ofvalue 
in near-term earnings and negatively associated with the proportion of value in long-term 
earnings. This evidence indicates that institutions with the strongest incentives to favor firms 
with a high proportion of value in near-term earnings exhibit such preferences. 
To test whether institutional preferences for near-term earnings cause stocks to be priced 
myopically, I use a methodology similar to Abarbanell and Bernard [1998] (AB). AB regresses 
stock price on book value, the present value of near-term earnings, and the present value of a 
terminal value and find no evidence of myopic pricing by the market as a whole. However, if 
certain types of institutions exhibit strong preferences for near-term earnings over long-run 
value, then firms with high levels of such institutional ownership and with this distribution of 
value might exhibit myopic pricing due to the high institutional demand for the stock. I modify 
the AB regression to include interaction terms for firms with high levels of institutional 
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ownership to test whether institutions overpay (underpay) for near-term value (long-term value). 
Because a coefficient that differs from the hypothesized value in this test could either indicate 
mispricing or measurement error (AB), I also perform future returns tests to examine whether 
profitable trading strategies can be executed based on instances of apparent mispricing. 
Significant returns from these strategies would be consistent with mispricing, whereas 
insignificant returns would suggest measurement error. 
The results indicate that high levels of ownership by transient institutions, who exhibit 
strong preferences for near-term earnings, are associated with overweighting of the near-term 
earnings component ofvalue and underweighting of the long-term earnings component. The 
future returns test finds trading strategy returns that are consistent in sign with mispricing, and 
statistically significant two-to-three years after the portfolio formation date. Thus, transient 
institutions not only exhibit strong preferences for near-term earnings, but these preferences also 
translate into significant misvaluations. In the case of banks, the other group of institutions with 
strong preferences for near-term earnings, I find no significant evidence of mispricing when 
banks have high levels of ownership. Because I report that most banks have longer holding 
periods than transient institutions, these results suggest that short-term preferences of institutions 
only translate into mispricing when institutions also have short investment horizons. 
The next section reviews the claims and evidence of institutional myopia and develops 
testable hypotheses. Section III presents the valuation model and methodology used to test the 
hypotheses. Section IV describes the sample and provides descriptive statistics on the constructs 
used in the empirical tests. Section V provides results, and Section VI contains a summary and 
conclusions. 
3 
II. Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value? 
As institutional investors became the dominant equity holder in the US during the past 
twenty years, many critics expressed concerns that the alleged short-term focus of institutional 
investors creates pressures on US managers to make decisions that sacrifice long-term value to 
meet short-term goals (see Lowenstein [1988], Jacobs [1991], Porter [1992], and Laverty [1996] 
for detailed descriptions of these concerns). For example, Drucker [1986] argues that "corporate 
managements are being pushed [by institutional investors] into subordinating everything (even 
such long-range considerations as a company's market standing, its technology, indeed its basic 
wealth producing capacity) to immediate earnings and next week's stock price" (p. 32). 
Whether or not institutions are actually applying this pressure, managers believe they are under 
such pressure. In a Business Week/Harris poll of 400 CEO's, 60% of the respondents cited 
institutional investors as a prime source of short-term performance pressure (Nussbaum [1987]). 
Prior research on whether institutional investors exhibit a short-term focus in their 
investment decisions has found limited evidence to support this concern. Numerous papers have 
tested whether institutions prefer firms with lower levels of investment in long-term projects like 
R&D (Baysinger et al1991, Hansen and Hil11991, Wahal and McConnel11998). The evidence 
generally indicates that institutional ownership is positively associated with R&D spending, 
implying that institutional investors are not myopic. Additionally, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
[1998] find no evidence that the level of institutional ownership is associated with income-
increasing accruals, which suggests that institutions do not pressure managers to maximize near-
term earnings. However, institutions could still be focused on short-term earnings performance 
if, in these cases, R&D or accrual changes are not needed to meet current earnings goals. 
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Looking at institutional myopia with respect to current earnings, Eames [ 1998] finds 
limited evidence of institutional trading in response to annual earnings news. However, Lang 
and McNichols [ 1997] find ev idence of a positive relationship between changes in institutional 
holdings and both quarterly earnings forecast errors and quarterly revisions of forecasts of one-
year-ahead earnings. This finding indicates a sensitivity to short-term earnings news, but does 
not necessarily imply myopia because longer-term earnings are likely highly correlated with the 
short-term news. Thus, the evidence to date on institutional short-sightedness is difficult to 
interpret due to the lack of a good methodology for showing that institutions prefer near-term 
earnings at the expense of longer-term earnings, as implied by the myopia argument. 
This paper makes two methodological extensions to prior work to test for institutional 
preferences for near-term earnings over long-run value. First, using the Ohlson [ 1995] valuation 
model, I segregate firm value into three categories-book value, near-term abnormal earnings, 
and long-run (terminal) value-to control for the long-term value implications of near-term 
earnings realizations . Book value represents that component of firm value that has already been 
captured by the accounting system. The near-term abnormal earnings component represents firm 
value that will be realized through earnings in the next four years. Long-run value is the 
remainder of firm value, which will only be captured by the accounting system through earnings 
after four years . In regressing the level of institutional holdings on these three categories, the 
relative weightings indicate any institutional preferences over the timing with which firm value 
will be recognized into the financial statements. 
Second, this paper uses the arguments for why institutions would have preferences for 
near-term earnings to focus on the types of institutions most likely to exhibit such preferences. 
There are two widely-cited sources of the alleged short-term focus by institutions: short expected 
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investment horizons and strict fiduciary responsibilities (Porter [1992], Graves and Waddock 
[1990]). Prior research indicates that institutions are not a homogeneous group along either of 
these dimensions (Del Guercio [1996], Lang and McNichols [1997], Bushee [1998]). These 
differences could lead to differences in the sensitivity of institutional investors to the distribution 
of future value. Thus, I test for short-term preferences of institutions classified along these two 
dimensions. First, I classify institutions based on the frequency of their trading to proxy for the 
length of their inv estment horizon. Second, I classify institutions based on their legal form (e.g. 
banks, pensions, etc.) to capture differences in fiduciary standards across types of institutions. 
2. 3.1 Classification based on investment horizon 
A common explanation for why institutional inv estors have preferences for near-term 
earnings over long-run value is that they have short expected inv estment horizons (Graves and 
Waddock [1990], Porter [1992]). There is intense competition among some institutional 
investors for client funds to inv est. Such competition engenders a quest for good portfolio 
performance in the short-run (Graves and Waddock [1990]).1 This quest for short-term 
performance leads to the adoption of more aggressive trading strategies (such as market timing 
and technical analysis) at the expense of buy-and-hold investment strategies based on firm 
fundamentals.2 Lowenstein [1988] argues that, "by encouraging an emphasis on trading rather 
than investing, they [institutional inv estors] focus the intelligence and energies of the investment 
community on short-term developments" (p. 64). This claim is reinforced by survey evidence 
that found that 55% ofthe institutional investors surveyed would sell a stock based solely on a 
1 Even if institutions have long-term investment goals, the vast majority of fum performance benchmarks are short-
term oriented (e.g . quarterly earnings reports, monthly sales figures). These short-run firm performance measures 
naturally lead to the evaluation of ftmd managers over the same horizon, creating incentives for a short investment 
horizon (O'Barr and Conley [1992]). 
2 In support of this idea, Froot et al. [ 1992] model an equilibrium where, if speculators have short investment 
horizons, they will herd on the same short -term information, even if it is unrelated to firm value. 
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report of bad news about current or near-term performance in the Wall Street Journal (Pound and 
Shiller [ 1987]). Thus, short-term inv estment horizons of institutions, and the desire to try to earn 
trading profits based on near-term earnings, could translate into a preference for firms for which 
near-term earnings have a larger valuation impact. 
To test for this effect, I classify institutions into groups based on their expected 
investment horizon. I use the classification method dev eloped by Bushee [ 1998], who separates 
institutions into three groups based on their past portfolio management behavior. The first 
group of institutions, called ''transient institutions," are characterized as having high portfolio 
turnover and highly diversified portfolio holdings. These characteristics reflect the fact that 
transient institutions tend to be short-term-focused investors whose interest in the firm' s stock is 
based on the likelihood of short-term returns rather than long-term capital appreciation or 
dividends (Porter [1992]). As such, transient institutions are the group of investors argued to 
create incentives for managerial myopia due to the fact that a near-term earnings disappointment 
could trigger large-scale selling by such institutions and temporarily depress the firm 's stock 
price (Porter [1992], Jacobs [1991]). In support ofthis argument, Bushee [1998] fmds that 
managers are more likely to cut R&D expenditures to meet current earnings targets if their firm 's 
ownership is dominated by transient institutions. 
The other two types of institutions classified by Bushee [ 1998], "quasi-indexers" and 
"dedicated," provide long-term, stable ownership in firms as they are geared toward longer-term 
dividend income or capital appreciation. Dedicated institutions are characterized by large 
average investments in portfolio firms and extremely low turnover, consistent with a 
"relationship investing" role and a commitment to provide long-term patient capital (Porter 
[1992], Dobrzynski [ 1993]). Quasi-indexers are also characterized by low turnover, but they 
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tend to have diversified holdings, consistent with a passive, buy-and-hold strategy of investing 
portfolio funds in a broad set offrrms (Porter [1992]). Because of the longer investment 
horizons of these two types of institutions, they should be less focused on near-term earnings and 
be more likely to have preferences that are insensitive to the distribution of future value. 
If the institutions with short investment horizons (transient institutions) are more focused 
on near-term earnings because their information gathering is attuned to near-term news, and if 
firms with a higher percentage of value in near-term earnings provide more profit opportunities 
due to the larger expected valuation impacts of short-term news, then the following hypothesis 
should be supported: 
Hypothesis 1a: The level of institutional holdings by transient institutions will be positively 
(negatively) associated with the proportion of firm value in near-term earnings (long-run 
value). 
The absence of a short investment horizon does not imply that such institutions will favor longer-
term value, or will not still favor near-term value. Thus, the tests for dedicated and quasi-indexer 
institutions should be viewed as descriptive and as a benchmark to test whether investment 
horizon lengths are a determinant of institutional investor preferences for near-term earnings . 
2.3.2 Classification based on fiduciary standards 
A second explanation for the alleged short-term focus of institutions is that many 
institutions have a fiduciary duty to prudently invest funds on behalf of their clients. While 
diversification may seem prudent according to modern portfolio theory, many courts have made 
rulings consistent with the idea that each stock must be evaluated individually as to its merits 
(Badrinath, Gay, and Kale [ 1989]). Current earnings performance of portfolio firms is often 
used by clients and the courts as an objective criteria to judge the prudence of an investment 
(O'Barr and Conley [ 1992], Del Guercio [ 1996]. Thus, an institution may be sensitive to the 
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short-term earnings performance of each stock in its portfolio. Firms with a large proportion of 
their value contained in near-term earnings, which are forecasted by analysts, may appear as 
safer investments than f"mns whose market value is predominantly composed of more uncertain 
long-term expectations of growth. 
To test for the impact of fiduciary restrictions, I split institutions into four groups based 
on their legal form: bank trusts, insurance companies, investment advisors (including mutual 
fund companies), and pensions and endowments. Prior research finds that this classification 
highlights significant differences across institutions in preferences for current earnings news and 
for certain firm characteristics like size and growth potential (Del Guercio [ 1996], Lang and 
McNichols [ 1997], Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy [1998]). Banks manage equities on the 
behalf of indiv iduals and other institutions through their trust departments. They face strict 
fiduciary requirements that cause them to avoid stocks which courts would v iew as imprudent 
(Badrinath, Gay and Kale [1989], Del Guercio [19%]). Pensions and endowments consist of 
corporate (private) pensions, public pensions, and the endowments ofuniversities and 
foundations. This group of institutions also faces fairly strict fiduciary responsibilities, though 
the prudent person standard has not been as strictly enforced on pensions as it has on bank trusts 
(O'Barr and Conley [1992], Del Guercio [1996]). 
Insurance companies hold equities as an investment vehicle for their premiums and 
manage some private pension funds. In contrast to banks and pensions, these institutions are 
subject to less restrictive fiduciary constraints. Investment companies and advisors (hereafter 
investment advisors) manage individual investments through mutual funds and serve as external 
fund managers for pensions and endowments. Investment advisors are chosen as investment 
vehicles because they promise short-term liquidity; clients can generally withdraw their funds on 
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demand. Historically, investment advisors have been held to the least restrictive fiduciary 
responsibilities of any type of institution (Del Guercio [1996]). 
Based on the above differences, preferences for near-term earnings are most likely to be 
manifested in those institutions that face the most restrictive fiduciary standards. Firms with a 
higher percentage of value expected to be realized in near-term, forecasted earnings will likely 
be viewed as safer investments than firms whose stock price mainly consists of expectations of 
value arising in distant periods. If differences in fiduciary restrictions are binding constraints on 
institutions' investment patterns and if firms with less value in long-term earnings are viewed as 
more prudent, the following hypothesis should be supported: 
Hypothesis 1b: The level of institutional holdings by banks and pensions will be positively 
(negatively) associated with the proportion of firm value in near-term earnings (long-run 
value). 
Again, the tests for insurance companies and investment advisers should be viewed as 
descriptive and as a benchmark to test whether fiduciary standards are a determinant of 
institutional investor preferences for near-term earnings. 
2.2 Do Institutional Investors Cause Stocks to be Myopically Priced? 
While the above test provides evidence on the implicit investment preferences of 
institutional investors, it does not necessarily imply that these preferences should influence the 
investment horizons of corporate managers. For instance, O'Barr and Conley [1992] argue that 
most institutions take little interest in corporate governance; thus, short-sighted institutions 
would be more likely to sell out rather than try to influence the manager's investment pattern. To 
link institutional myopia to managerial myopia, critics have claimed that institutions not only 
prefer near-term earnings, but pay too much to get them (Lowenstein [ 1988]). In other words, 
the desire of institutions to hold f"rrms with good expected near-term performance may cause a 
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firm's stock to be myopically priced, with near-term earnings overvalued and long-term earnings 
undervalued. Such mispricing could then lead current-price-maximizing managers to shift their 
investment horizon to a more short-term focus. Therefore, in my next set of tests, I examine 
whether some institutions cause firms to be myopically priced. 
Prior research has again found limited evidence supporting the allegation that short-term 
preferences of institutional investors lead to mispricing. Using a similar breakdown offirm 
value into book value, near-term abnormal earnings, and long-run (terminal) value components, 
AB tests whether firms in the US stock market are myopically priced. They find that, on 
average, near-term earnings are not overvalued, but correctly priced. They also find that an 
apparent undervaluation of the terminal value is really measurement error, and that this portion 
of firm value is also likely correctly priced. However, their study groups together all firms, 
including those with little or no institutional ownership. Both Eames [ 1998] and Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam [1998] run earnings response coefficient tests conditioning on the level of 
institutional ownership. Neither study finds evidence consistent with myopic mispricing by 
institutional investors. However, this result is not surprising given that they both find no 
evidence that institutional investors as a whole have preferences for short-term earnings. If only 
certain types of institutions exhibit short-term preferences, as predicted by hypotheses 1a and 1 b, 
then a more powerful test of myopic mispricing is to focus on ownership by these types. If the 
preferences of such institutions for the timing of future earnings cause systematic deviations of 
price from intrinsic values, the following hypotheses will be supported: 
Hypothesis 2a: For firms with high levels of institutional ownership by transient institutions, 
the proportion of value in near-term earnings (long-run value) will be over- (under-) valued. 
Hypothesis 2b: For firms with high levels of institutional ownership by banks or pensions, 
the proportion of value in near-term earnings (long-run value) will be over- (under-) valued. 
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Tests for Institutional Investor Preferences over the Timing of Future Earnings 
The first step in developing the empirical tests is to separate firm v alue into components 
based on when the v alue is expected to be realized through the accounting system. The model 
used here is based on the AB empirical adaptation of the Ohlson [1995] valuation model. 
Ohlson [1995] shows that by assuming clean surplus accounting-the change in book 
value is equal to earnings minus net div idends-the value of the firm (Pt) can be written in terms 
of accounting book value (bt) and earnings (xt), with r representing the cost of capital:3 
"' 
P1 = b 1 + ~(1+ rt' E 1 [x1+< -r· bt+<-J ( 1) 
r =l 
From equation (1), AB note that the expected price-to-book premium at an arbitrary future 
horizon Tis: 
"' 
E 1 [Pt+T- bt+T ] = ~ (1 + r fE1 [x 1+< - r · b t+H] (2) 
r=T 
The Value Line database provides forecasts of earnings, book values, and price-earnings ratios 
for up to four years ahead. Because point forecasts of earnings are not available beyond that 
horizon, I use four years as the point to demarcate the near-term from the long-term.4 
Substituting (2) into (1) at T = 4 yields the following expression, which segregates firm v alue in 
three components based on when it will be realized through the accounting system as earnings: 
4 
P1 = b1 + ~(1 + rt' E 1 [x t+< -r · b 1+<_1 ]+ (1+ r)-4 E 1 [P1+4 - b 1+4 ] (3) 
= BV1 + PV AX1 + PVTV1 
3 This relation is also based on the following assumptions: price is equal to the present value of all future dividends, 
there is risk neutral pricing, and there is a constant and nonstochastic term structure of interest rates. 
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The first component of (3), BV , represents that portion of firm value that has already been 
captured by the accounting system. The second component of (3), PV AX, is the present value of 
abnormal earnings ov er the next four years. This component captures the part of firm value that 
will be realized through accounting earnings in the near-term. The final component of (3), 
PV TV, is the present value of the forecasted terminal v alue four years hence. The terminal v alue 
represents all future earnings occurring beyond the four-year horizon, and thus represents that 
component of firm value that will take the longest to flow through the accounting system. 
I calculate the variables BV, PV AX, and PVTV using forecast data from Value Line to 
proxy for market expectations, with firm-specific estimates of discount rates. 5 To test for 
institutional investor preferences for the distribution of value, I divide these variables by price to 
obtain the proportion of firm value in each ofthe three components and perform the following 
regresswn: 
PIHt =Yo + y1 (BVt !PJ+ y2 (PV AXt ! PJ+ y3 (PVTVt ! PJ+ ct 
=Yo+ y1BVCt + y 2 AXCt + y 3 TVCt + ct 
(4) 
where PIH is the percentage of institutional ownership and BVC, AXC, and TVC represent the 
price-deflated values ofBV, PV AX, and PVTV, respectively . If institutions exhibit no 
preferences ov er when value is realized through the accounting system and instead choose their 
level of ownership based on other factors (such as stock returns, stock ratings, etc.), the 
coefficients on AXC and TVC should not be different from zero. If institutions prefer value to 
4 Depending on the degree of institutional investor myopia, four years might be too long to accurately measure the 
"near-term." To explore this possibility, I also run all of the tests defining the near-term to be one year ahead. 
These results are discussed in Section V. 
5 Prior research has used ex post realizations (Penman and Sougiannis [ 1998]) and time-series forecasts from 
historical data (Frankel and Lee [1998]) to calculate implicit value using the Ohlson model. The advantages of the 
Value Line data are that it provides an ex ante expectation and that it is not subject to the intertemporal 
inconsistency problem identified by Myers [1999]. Also, Value Line provides forecasts of earnings, dividends, and 
book values that are consistent with clean surplus in over 90% of the observations. The disadvantage of Value Line 
data is that it represents only one analyst' s expectations and that it exhibits the optimistic bias typically found in 
analyst forecast data. 
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be realized through the accounting system in near-term earnings rather than in long-term 
earnings, the test should yield the following estimated coefficients: 
(Hypothesis 1)6 
I make no formal hypotheses concerning the coefficient on BVC since the myopia arguments 
deal with the trade-off between near- and long-term expected earnings, and not the total amount 
of unrecorded goodwill a ftrm has (i.e. whether it is a value ftrm or a growth firm). 
An important drawback to estimating equation ( 4) as stated is that it is susceptible to a 
correlated omitted variables problem. Prior research shows that institutions choose their level of 
ownership based on other factors such as size, growth, performance, risk, stock ratings, and 
liquidity, all of which are likely correlated with the distribution offtrm value. To address this 
problem, I include a number of control variables to capture these relations. 
I include ftrm size (SIZE), measured as the log of market value of equity, to control for 
institutions' preferences for large firms. Institutions prefer large firms due to concerns ov er 
prudent person standards, the desire for liquidity, and the presence of lower information 
asymmetries (Del Guercio [ 1996], Gompers and Metrick [ 1998]). Related to this v ariable, I 
explicitly control for the firm 's S&P stock rating (RATE) and number of years the firm has been 
listed (TIME), both of which could be important measures of the prudence of an investment 
(Badrinath, Gay, and Kale [ 1989], Del Guercio [ 1996]). I also directly control for the firm 's 
liquidity (LIQ), measured as the average trading volume in the ftrm 's stock divided by the 
average shares outstanding (Badrinath, Gay, and Kale [1989], Del Guercio [1996], Falkenstein 
[1996], Gompers and Metrick [1998]). Next, I add an indicator variable for whether a firm is 
listed on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500. 'lhis variable is positively associated with 
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institutional holdings due to the fact that many institutions index some portion of their equity 
holdings (Del Guercio [1996], Gompers and Metrick [1998]). Institutions have also been shown 
to have preferences for firms that pay dividends, so I include the firm 's dividend yield (YIELD), 
measured as the ratio of dividends to price (Badrinath, Gay, and Kale [ 1989], Del Guercio 
[1996], Falkenstein [1996], Gompers and Metrick [1998]). 
I include three variables to proxy for the riskiness of the firm. Systematic risk is proxied 
by the firm, s market-model beta (BET A), total risk is proxied by the standard deviation of 
returns (STD), and risk of losses in case of bankruptcy is proxied by the firm ' s leverage ratio 
(LEV), which is measured as the ratio of debt to assets. Prior research finds that institutions 
generally prefer f"rrms with high BETA, but low STD and LEV (Badrinath, Gay, and Kale 
[1989], Falkenstein [1996]). The firm 's market-adjusted returns (MAR) over the past year are 
included to control for recent market performance, which has been shown to be positively 
associated with institutional holdings (O'Brien and Bhushan [ 1990], Falkenstein [ 1996], Lang 
and McNichols [1997], Gompers and Metrick [1998]). To proxy for preferences for growth 
firms, I include the firm 's average sales growth (SGR) over the prior three years. This variable 
has not been examined by prior research, but is important to include to ensure that the firm value 
components are not proxying for recent growth. Finally, I include the firm 's R&D intensity 
(R&D), measured as the ratio of R&D expense to sales. Prior research has tested for institutional 
myopia using this variable, generally finding that institutional ownership is positively associated 
with R&D spending (Baysinger et al [1991], Wahal and McConnell [1998]). 
After including all of the control variables, the final empirical specification of the test is 
as follows: 
6 If the Value Line forecasts serve as poor proxies for market expectations, then the resultant errors-in-variables 
problem will bias the coefficients towards zero. Thus, the presence of measurement error in the forecasts works 
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PIH1 =Yo+ y1BVC1 + y 2 AXC1 + y3 TVC 1 + y 4 SIZE1 + y5LEV1 + y 6 SP5001 + y7 MAR 1 + 
y 8BETA1 +y9 STD 1 +y10LIQ1 + YuYIELD1 +y12R&D 1 + y13 THvffi 1 + (5) 
y14RATE 1 + y15SGR1 + e1 
To test for differences in myopia across types of institutions, I replace PIH in equation (5) 
with the percent holdings by each group of institution, denoted as DED (dedicated), QIX (quasi-
indexer), TRA (transient), BNK (banks), INS (insurance companies), lA (inv estment advisers), 
and P&E (pensions and endowments). 
3.2 Tests for Myopic Pricing 
3. 2.1 Price level test 
The next set oftests examines whether institutional preferences for the distribution of 
future earnings translate into the mispricing of stocks. If there is heavy demand by certain 
institutions for firms with a high (low) proportion of value in near-term earnings (long-run 
value), such institutions may place too much weight on near-term earnings and too little weight 
on long-term earnings in valuing the firm. I test for these effects using the methodology of AB, 
who test whether the US stock market, as a whole, exhibits myopic mispricing. 
Based on equation (3), AB test for myopic pricing with the following regression: 
(6) 
Because each component is discounted to present value, an extra dollar ofPV AX or PVTV 
should increase price by a dollar, indicating an expected coefficient of one on each of the 
regressors. Also, as indicated by equation (3), the intercept should be zero because value is 
completely explained by the three value components. AB report estimated coefficients that are 
not significantly different from one for both BV and PV AX, and a coefficient significantly less 
against finding results in support the myopia hypothesis . 
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than one on PVTV. These results only partially support myopic mispricing for the market as a 
whole.7 
To test whether mispricing is concentrated in firms with high levels of short-sighted 
institutional investors, I interact the variables in equation (6) with an indicator variable (DPlli) 
for high levels of institutional ownership. I define the indicator variable DPIH to be equal to one 
if the firm 's institutional ownership of a given type is in the top decile of PIH for all rrrms during 
the year and zero otherwise (with PIH replaced by the variables for ownership by each group of 
institutions identified earlier).8 This approach produces the following model: 
P1 = a 0 + a 1 DPIJ\ + a 2BV1 + a 3 (BV * DPIH)1 + a 4 PV AX1 + a5 (PV AX* DPIH)1 + 
a 6PVTVt +a7 (PVTV *DPIH)t +17jt (7) 
In this model, the null hypothesis of efficient pricing would be: 
(Null hypothesis of no mispricing) 
The alternative hypothesis that high levels of institutional ownership cause rrrms to be priced 
myopically relative to the theoretical weighting is: 
(Hypothesis 2) 
Thus, if firms with high institutional ownership of a given type are mispriced, this hypothesis 
requires that 1) the coefficient on the interaction term be significantly different from zero and 2) 
the sum of the two coefficients on each variable be significantly different from one. 
3.2.2 Future returns test 
As AB discuss, measurement error in the proxies for market expectations of future value 
or for the discount rate would bias the coefficients away from one and give the appearance of 
7 AB perform future return tests which indicate that the possible mispricing is actually measurement error. These 
tests are discussed in the next section. 
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improper weighting by the market. To determine whether measurement error or mispricing is 
driving the above results, AB implement a future returns test. If an apparent mispricing is due to 
myopic preferences, then the mispricing should be reversed as the future earnings become 
realized, generating predictable future abnormal returns. Howev er, if the apparent mispricing is 
solely due to measurement error, then no future abnormal returns should be observed. Because 
the potential mispricing pertains to earnings forecasts as much as four years in the future, I 
examine abnormal returns for up to five years into the future. 
To perform the future returns test, I adopt a "Fama and McBeth" methodology similar to 
the approach used by Abarbanell and Bushee [1998]. This approach involves first calculating 
scaled decile ranks for each value component (denoted RBVC, RAXC, and RTVC).9 The scaled 
decile rank is computed by forming deciles of the distribution of each independent variable in 
each year (after all of the forecasts are released to the public), and then dividing the decile rank 
by nine so that the scaled decile rank ranges between zero and one. To test for institutional 
influence on mispricing, each value component variable is interacted with the decile of 
institutional ownership (RPIH) to produce a scaled rank variable that represents a strategy that 
takes long (short) positions in firms with high (low) value component values and high (low) 
levels of institutional ownership. 10 This approach produces the following regression: 
CAR(I) 1 = {30 + {31RBVC 1 + {32 (RBVC*RPIH)1 + {33 RAXC1 + {34 (RAXC* RPIH)1 
+ {35 RTVC1 + {36 (RTVC * RPIH) 1 + {37 RSIZE 1 + {38 RBETA1 + {39 REP1 + Sjt (8) 
8 I chose deciles to ensure that firms in the highest group had substantially high institutional ownership of each 
type. I re-ran all of the tests using quintiles, and the results were similar, but less significant. Thus, the decile 
approach is n ecessary to get sufficient power to detect the effect of institutional ownership on pricing. 
9 Because returns are the dependent variable, BV, PV AX, and PVTV are deflated by beginning price, yielding the 
BVC, AXC, and TVC variables used in the institutional holdings test. 
10 To compute this scaled rank variable, the decile of the value component (1 , 10) is multiplied by the decile of 
institutional ownership (1, 10) to obtain a value between 1 and 100. Then, this value is rescaled to range between 0 
and 99, and finally divided by 99 to get a variable that ranges between 0 and 1. 
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where CAR(I) are the buy-and-hold size-adjusted abnormal returns cumulated from the seventh 
month after the fiscal year end to the same time I years later, I = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The decile 
ranks of size (RSIZE), beta (RBET A), and the earnings-price ratio (REP) are included to capture 
any return impacts due to factors identified by Fama and French [1992].11 An indiv idual 
coefficient in this specification represents the abnormal return to a zero-investment portfolio 
optimally formed to exploit the information in the associated independent variable that is 
orthogonal to the information in the other variables (Abarbanell and Bushee [1998]). If 
institutional myopia leads to mispricing, the coefficient on RAXC*RPIH (RTVC*RPIH) should 
be significantly less (greater) than zero over some horizon as the mispricing reverses itself. To 
test for myopic pricing by the various groups of institutions, I replace RPIH in equation (8) with 
ownership variables for each of the groups of institutions identified earlier. 
IV. Sam pie and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Sample 
The sample includes all firm-years between 1980 and 1992 with available data on Value 
Line, Spectrum, Compustat, and CRSP. The final sample consists of 10,380 firm-years, with 
673-973 observations per year. 
The forecasts of future earnings, book values, and prices are obtained from the University 
ofMichigan Value Line database, which contains electronic versions of Value Line reports for 
the years 1978-92. Using the Value Line report issued during the third quarter of a firm's fiscal 
year, forecasts are av ailable for the next fiscal year, the year after, and a long-range forecast 
labeled "three-to-five years" ahead. Following AB, these three-to-five year forecasts are 
assumed to be forecasts for four-years ahead. A three-year-ahead forecast is also required by the 
11 The other main Fama-French factor is book-to-market, which is captured in the BVC variable. 
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model, and is obtained by interpolating between the two-year-ahead and four-year-ahead 
forecasts. The forecast of long-run (terminal) value is calculated by multiplying the long-range 
PIE forecast by the long-range earnings forecast to obtain a predicted price. The forecasted 
terminal value is the difference between this price and the long-range forecast of book value. 
Historical book values and many of the control variables are obtained from the 1997 
Compustat Annual Files. The price at the end of the firm 's second quarter, cumulative size-
adjusted abnormal returns, and data for some of the control variables are collected from the 1997 
CRSP Daily Return Files. The price at the end of the second quarter is used to roughly 
correspond with the date of the Value Line forecast. Buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns are 
calculated as the difference between the cumulative raw returns of the firm over a given horizon 
and the contemporaneous return on an equally-weighted size decile control portfolio. 
The firm-specific discount rate used to calculate the present values of future earnings and 
terminal value is calculated using the CAPM with firm-specific betas and an assumed risk 
premium over the risk-free rate of 8% (AB).l2 
The institutional investor holdings data are obtained from the Harvard Business School 
Spectrum database, which contains all13-ffilings between 1980 and 1997. According to SEC 
Rule 13f-1, all institutions managing more than $100,000,000 in holdings must file a 13-fwith 
the SEC at the end of ev ery calendar quarter. The 13-f must report all equity holdings greater 
than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. Thus, the data used in this study reflect end-of-
calendar-quarter holdings for those fund managers ftling 13-f's. The holdings data are collected 
as of the end ofthe third calendar quarter, which is the first holdings date available after the 
release ofthe Value Line forecasts. 
12 I also estimated the variables using a 6% risk premium and using constant discount rates of 11%-15%. There 
were no qualitative differences in results under these alternative approaches. 
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Institutions are classified into the three groups using a factor and cluster analysis 
approach described in Bushee [ 1998].13 Panel A of table 1 describes the mean portfolio 
characteristics (in terms of standardized factor scores) of the three types of institutional investors. 
Transient institutions (TRA) have high portfolio turnover (high PTURN factor) and diversified 
portfolios (low BLOCK factor), as well as preferences for smaller rrrms (low FSIZE factor) . 
Dedicated institutions (DED) hav e low turnover and more concentrated portfolio holdings (high 
BLOCK factor), and also tend to prefer smaller firms. The quasi-indexer institutions have low 
turnover and diversified holdings, and tend to hold larger firms (consistent with many index 
strategies). The proportion of institution-years in each group is roughly similar to that reported 
in Bushee [1998] over a different sample period. 
Institutions are classified into types based on the classification provided on the Spectrum 
database. Spectrum identifies fiv e classes on institutions: banks, insurance companies, 
investment companies, independent investment advisers, and "other", which includes internally-
managed public and private pension funds, colleges and universities, foundations, and other 
miscellaneous institutions (e.g. law firms , private citizens acting as institutions, etc.). I use the 
bank (BNK) and insurance companies (INS) categories as reported. I combine the inv estment 
companies and independent investment advisors into one category called " inv estment adv isors" 
(IA) because the two Spectrum categories are very similar in their fiduciary standards and fund 
sponsors. Finally, I drop an institution that is not clearly a pension, university, or foundation 
endowment to form the final group, pensions and endowments (P&E). Panel B of table 2 shows 
13 This approach starts with a large number of variables that have been used by prior research to describe 
institutional investor trading behavior and portfolio characteristics. To account for the high degree of 
multicollinearity among these variables, principal factor analysis is used to generate a small number of common 
factors that explain the shared variance among the original variables. Institutions are then classified into groups 
using k-means cluster analysis on the factor scores. 
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a cross-classification of institutional groups. There is a significant amount of heterogeneity 
across the two classification methods, so one method is not a proxy for the other. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the value component variables, the control 
variables, and the institutional ownership variables. The table indicates that the near-term 
earnings component (AXC) is a relatively small component offrrm value for most firms. The 
majority of the av erage firm's value is concentrated in book value or terminal value. In fact, 
AXC is negative on average, indicating that many firms in the sample hav e negative expected 
abnormal earnings in the near-term (note that this does not mean they have negative expected 
earnings). Summing the median levels ofBVC, AXC, and TVC yields a value of 1.04, which 
indicates that Value Line analysts are slightly more optimistic than the market's expectation. 
Table 2 also indicates that the sample firms tend to be larger than the population of firms, 
which is not surprising given the constraint of Value Line following. About 36% of the firm-
years were listed on the S&P 500, and the average time listed is 18 years, indicating a sample of 
rather mature firms. The mean level of institutional holdings over the sample period is 36%, of 
which the largest portion is held by pensions and endowments (12%). Investment advisers have 
the next largest holdings (9.6%), followed by banks (8%), and insurance companies (3.7%). The 
classification of institutions by portfolio management characteristics indicates that the majority 
of holdings are by quasi-indexer institutions (20%). 
Table 3 reports Pearson and Spearman correlations among the variables used in the 
empirical tests. There is a high negative correlation between the percent of value already 
recorded by the accounting system (BVC) and the percent to come in the future (AXC and 
TVC). However, there is not a trade-off between near-term and long-term earnings, indicated by 
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the significant positiv e correlation between AXC and TVC. Thus, tests of myopic preferences 
using short-term earnings alone would miss this correlation with future value. Almost all of the 
institutional holdings variables are significantly positively correlated with each other. Thus, 
there is no evidence that low ownership by one type of institution is systematically offset by 
higher ownership by another type. The univariate ev idence on the relationship between the 
levels of institutional ownership and the amount of firm value in a given component indicates, in 
general, a negative correlation with the book v alue component and a positive correlation with the 
near- and long-term earnings components . However, because the value components are 
correlated with the many of control v ariables, the effect of the value components per se on 
institutional ownership is difficult to discern without a multiple regression analysis . 
Table 3 also indicates that many of the univariate correlations are substantial in 
magnitude, indicating the multicollinearity may be a problem in the sample. To test this 
possibility, I performed variance inflation factor (VIF) analyses on each yearly regression in each 
of the empirical tests. VIF ' s are based on the R2 from regressing each independent variable on 
all other independent variables. A VIF of one indicates no multicollinearity and a VIF in excess 
of 10 indicates harmful multicollinearity (Kennedy [ 1992]). The highest VIF encountered was 
5.7, which while high is far below the cutoff for harmful multicollinearity. I also performed 
principal factor analysis on the control variables to account for the multicollinearity and reduce 
the set of variables to two linear combinations (a "size" factor and a "risk" factor) that explain 
most of the shared variance. Including these factors in the regression in lieu of the individual 
variables produces coefficients on the value components that are similar in magnitude but more 
strongly significant. 
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V. Results 
5.1 Evidence on Institutional Investor Preferences for tile Timing of Future Earnings 
Panel A oftable 4 provides results of the regression of institutional ownership on the 
three components offirm value and the control variables (equation (4)). To mitigate the problem 
of cross-sectional correlation inherent in a pooled cross-sectional regression (Bernard [ 1987]), 
regressions are run for each indiv idual year, and the mean coefficient across years is reported. 14 
Because the dependent variable is a levels variable, an adjustment for serial correlation in the 
yearly coefficients is made in calculating the standard errors for the mean coefficients (AB). 
Column 1 provides results for total institutional ownership (TIH), which allows a comparison to 
prior research that has looked only at the preferences of institutions as a whole. Ceteris paribus, 
institutions as a whole prefer firms with a higher proportion of v alue in unrecorded goodwill (i.e. 
"growth" firms), as indicated by the negative coefficient on BVC. The mean coefficient on the 
near-term earnings component (AXC) is positive and the mean coefficient on the long-term 
earnings coefficient (TVC) is negative. These findings are consistent with institutional investors 
as a whole having preferences for more value in near-term earnings than in long-run value, but 
neither coefficient is significant. Thus, the assertion that all institutions are short-sighted is not 
supported by the data. 
Columns 2-4 of table 4 provide results for institutional ownership classified by 
investment horizon. Transient investors (TRA) significantly prefer firms with more value in 
near-term earnings (AXC) and with less value in long-term earnings (TV C). Both results are 
consistent across years, as the coefficient on AXC (TVC) is positive (negative) in 10 ( 11) of 13 
years (not reported). Thus, transient institutions exhibit preferences consistent with institutional 
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investor myopia, supporting Porter's [ 1992] view that this type of investor is most likely to 
create pressure for strong short-term earnings performance (hypothesis 1a). Transient investors 
also significantly prefer firms with less value in book value, and their preferences drive the 
observed results for overall institutional ownership. Dedicated (DED) and quasi-indexer (QIX) 
institutions exhibit no significant preferences for the distribution of a firm ' s earnings other than a 
preference by dedicated institutions for firms with less value in the terminal value component. 
Columns 5-8 of table 4 provide results for institutional ownership classified by the 
fiduciary standards of the institution. The results generally support hypothesis 1b that fiduciary 
standards impact institutional preferences for a fmn 's distribution of value. Banks (BNK), 
which face the most stringent fiduciary standards, exhibit a significant preference for near-term 
earnings and a significant dislike of the long-term earnings component. This result is also 
consistent across years, hav ing the same sign in 11 of 13 years for both AXC and TVC (not 
reported). On the other hand, inv estment adv isers (lA) and insurance companies (IC), which 
face more lenient fiduciary standards, exhibit a significant preference for firms with less v alue in 
near-term earnings. For pensions and endowments (P&E), none of the value component 
variables are significant, indicating that other variables are more important in determining the 
investment decisions of this type of institution. 
The results for the control variables in table 4 indicate that there are many significant 
determinants of institutional investor ownership other than the distribution of earnings. Thus, it 
is unlikely that the v alue component variables are proxying for some other factor previously 
shown to influence institutional investment. Notably, all types of institutional ownership (expect 
banks) are significantly positiv ely related to R&D intensity, a common metric for measuring 
14 An analysis of the distribution of each of the independent variables revealed some outliers. As a result, all 
observations in the extreme 1% tails of the distribution were windsorized. The results for the sample of raw data are 
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institutional investor myopia. Thus, confirming much of prior research, institutions do not seem 
to be myopic with respect to R&D spending. Rather, certain types of institutions exhibit short-
term preferences for expected earnings performance. 
5.1.1 Sensitivity analyses 
To examine whether the results are sensitive to the definition of"near-term" (i.e. whether 
four-years is too far ahead to capture short-term preferences), I recalculated AXC and TVC 
based on a one-year ahead cut-off. I define AXC1 to be the present value of abnormal earnings 
one-year ahead and TVC1 to be the present value of the terminal value after one year (this is 
computed by moving the present value of abnormal earnings for years 2-4 into the TVC term). 
Panel B of table 4 presents results for this redefinition of near-term earnings. For total 
institutional ownership (column 1), the results are similar in sign to those in panel A, with larger, 
though still insignificant, mean coefficients. 
The results for the preferences of different groups of institutions mirror those in panel A, 
with the coefficients generally larger and more significant. One notable change in results is that 
the coefficient on TVC1 in the pension and endowment regression is significant at 0.05 level, 
whereas the coefficient on TVC was insignificant. Thus, despite rather stringent fiduciary 
responsibilities, pensions exhibit a propensity to invest in firms with a high proportion of future 
value expected beyond the next year, possibly because such institutions tend to have long 
investment horizons (see table 1). However, pensions also exhibit a weak preference for firms 
with higher amounts of value in book value, so the amount of value in unrecorded goodwill for 
firms held by pensions is likely not large. Overall, the results in panel B of table 4 indicate that, 
when institutions exhibit myopic preferences, they are manifested through preferences for a 
firms with a higher percentage of value in the next year's earnings. 
similar in significance, though the coefficients are smaller in magnitude. 
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As an additional test of institutional sensitivity to the distribution of earnings, I regressed 
three-year changes in institutional ownership on three-year changes in the value components and 
in the control v ariables. Three-year changes were chosen because they exhibited more 
dispersion in the changes in value components than one- and two-year changes. Table 5 
presents results of this regression for both the four-year horizon (panel A) and the one-year 
horizon (panel B). Changes in total institutional ownership are positively associated with 
changes in the amount of value in near-term earnings, especially when the near-term is defined to 
be one-year (CAXCl). This change is significantly driven by changes in both transient 
ownership (CTRA) and in bank ownership (CBNK), confirming the results from the levels 
regression. Changes in bank and transient institutional ownership are sensitive to changes in the 
amount ofvalue in terminal value, but only when terminal value is def"med based on the four-
year horizon (CTVC). Thus, table 5 indicates that the observed preferences of banks and 
transient institutions for near-term value is mostly focused on earnings in the next year and that 
the dislike of long-term value by these two types is driven changes in value expected to occur 
more than four years out. 
5.2 Evidence on Myopic Pricing by Institutions 
5. 2.1 Price level tests 
Table 6 presents results for the tests of whether institutions cause stocks to be myopically 
priced. Again, I use a yearly regression approach with mean coefficients and p-values based on 
adjusted standard errors reported in the table. Panel A presents results without institutional 
ownership interactions, replicating the results in AB. The coefficients on BV and PV AX are not 
significantly different from one, whereas the coefficient on PVTV is significantly less than one 
for the four-year horizon (in this table, the first p-value tests whether the coefficient is different 
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from zero, the second tests whether it is different from one, which is the null hypothesis). For 
the one-year horizon, the coefficient on PV AX is significantly greater than one, and the 
coefficient on PVTV remains significantly less than one. These results are similar to those 
reported by AB and are consistent with mispricing. However, in the future returns tests, AB 
finds that these overall results are more consistent with a measurement error explanation (a result 
confirmed later in this paper). Whether the differences are due to measurement error or 
mispricing, these results serve as the benchmark for the subsequent tests that interact the value 
component variables with indicators for high institutional ownership by type of institution. 
Panel B oftable 6 prov ides results of the price regression with interactions for high levels 
of institutional ownership classified by inv estment horizon (equation (7) ). 15 The indicator 
variables for high levels of ownership by both transient and quasi-indexer institutions are 
significantly different from zero, indicating that the valuation model understates market value on 
av erage for firms highly owned by these institutions. The coefficient on PV AX*DTRA 
(PVTV*DTRA) is significantly greater (less) than zero, and the implied total coefficient is 
significantly greater (less) than one, which supports hypothesis 2a that high levels of transient 
investor ownership are associated with overvaluation of near-term earnings and undervaluation 
of long-run value. The only other significant interaction in panel B is between PV AX and 
DQIX, indicating that higher ownership by quasi-indexers is associated with an apparent 
overvaluation of near-term earnings. A possible explanation for why the results for QIX parallel 
those for TRAin this regression is that there is some time-series instability in the classification 
scheme, such that some institutions (about 20% per year) move between the two categories over 
time. This instability is due to the fact that the Spectrum data aggregates all funds within a fund 
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family and thus changes in the relative size of the various funds in a fund family can cause its 
classification to switch between groups. 
Panel C oftable 6 presents results for the classification of institutions by fiduciary 
standards. The interactions between the indicator for high bank ownership (DBNK) and both 
PV AX and PVTV are not significantly different from zero. The result does not support 
hypothesis 2b that high levels of bank ownership lead to significant mispricing. The interaction 
between PV AX and DIA is significantly different from zero in the one-year horizon regression, 
which indicates a relation between investment advisor ownership and overweighting of near-
term earnings. Because the results in table 4 indicate a negative relation between IA ownership 
and this component of value, this result is not consistent with demand-driven mispricing and 
likely reflects some other unknown effect. The only other significant interaction in the panel is 
between the indicator for high insurance ownership (DINS) and PVTV, which suggests that high 
ownership by insurance companies lead to less underweighting ofthe terminal value (though the 
implied total coefficient is still significantly less than one). 
5.2.2 Future return tests 
Table 7 reports results for the future returns test (equation (8)). This test provides 
evidence on whether the price level tests in table 6 are likely driven by mispricing or by 
measurement error in the implicit value variables. The table does not report intercepts, which are 
always insignificant, or the RSIZE, RBET A, and REP variables, which are generally 
significantly negative, insignificant, and weakly significantly positive, respectively. Panel A 
presents results without institutional ownership interactions. The coefficients on RBVC are 
generally positive and significant, indicating a significant book-to-market effect in the data that 
15 I omit the results for institutions as a whole because the results in tables 4 and 5 indicate little evidence of short-
sighted preferences among institutions as a whole, and the mispricing tests fmd no significant evidence of 
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is consistent with prior research (Fama and French [1992]). Consistent with AB, the coefficients 
on RAXC (RTVC) are positive (negative) and often significant. Note that these returns go in the 
opposite direction of a myopic mispricing effect, which would lead to negative (positive) future 
returns to the RAXC (RTVC) components. Thus, the deviations of the coefficients from 
theoretical values reported for all firms in table 6 is likely a product of measurement error in the 
calculation of value or some uncontrolled for risk factor. \Vhatever the cause, these results serve 
as the benchmark for looking at differences in stocks largely held by institutional investors. In 
the following tests, I control for the returns to these unconditional strategies in looking at the 
returns to strategies that interact the value component with the level of institutional ownership. 
Panel B of table 7 reports results for trading strategies based on interactions between 
value components and the level of ownership by institutions classified by investment horizon. 
The analogous panel in table 6 indicated that high levels of transient institutional ownership are 
associated with a higher (lower) multiple on near-term earnings (long-run value) than expected, 
suggesting potential misvaluation. Table 7 indicates that the coefficients on the RAXC*RTRA 
variables are consistently negative, and the coefficient after two years is significantly less than 
zero for both one-year and four-year horizons. These implied negative portfolio returns are 
consistent with transient institutions mispricing near-term earnings, which supports hypothesis 
2a. The coefficients on RTVC*RTRA are consistently positive and are significant in the two-to-
three year return period. These implied positive returns are consistent with transient institutions 
undervaluing the long-run value component, again supporting hypothesis 2a. Thus, the results of 
tables 4-7 indicate that transient institutions not only prefer firms with more (less) value in near-
term (long-term) earnings, but their ownership is associated with systematic mispricing of these 
components. 
mispricing based on high levels of overall institutional ownership. 
30 
Panel D oftable 7 presents results for interactions based on the fiduciary standards of the 
institution. The results in table 6 indicated no misvaluation of future earnings based on high 
levels of bank ownership, and the results in table 7 confirm that there are no abnormal future 
returns produced by strategies based on the level of bank ownership. Thus, there is no evidence 
to support hypothesis 2b. Overall, the results from tables 4-7 suggest that, while banks have 
preferences for firms with higher (lower) proportions of value in near-term (long-term) earnings, 
they do not push the market price away from implicit value to acquire ownership in such firms. 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
The goal of this paper was to examine the common contention that institutional investors 
are short-sighted in preferring more of a firm's value to be realized in near-term, rather than long-
term, earnings. Such preferences are to be expected if competitive pressures, prudent person 
standards, and frequent performance evaluations all conspire to drive fund managers to search 
for stocks which will produce solid earnings in the near-term, ev en at the expense of long-run 
value. The results indicate that institutions as a whole exhibit only weak preferences for firms 
with a higher proportion of value in near-term earnings and a smaller proportion in long-term 
earnings. However, institutions that face the strictest fiduciary standards (banks) and have the 
shortest investment horizons (transient institutions) exhibit strong preferences for near-term 
earnings over long-run value. Thus, managers of firms with a high (low) percentage ofvalue in 
near-term (long-term) earnings and high levels of ownership by banks and transient institutions 
likely face the strongest incentives to make myopic decisions to please their investor bases. 
Given that banks and transient institutions exhibit myopic preferences for near-term 
earnings, the paper next tests whether these institutions pay too much for near-term earnings and 
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too little for long-term v alue, causing stocks to be myopically priced. If such institutions drive 
such myopic pricing, it is likely to be manifested in firms with a high percentage of ownership by 
such institutions. For these firms, institutions are most likely to be the price setters, and 
competition among institutions to own these firms (which presumably hav e a desired distribution 
of future earnings) could cause misvaluation of future earnings. Although banks exhibit 
preferences for near-term earnings over long-run value, these preferences do not translate into 
significant mispricings. However, the results indicate that high levels of ownership by transient 
institutions are associated with significant over- (under-) weighted of the near-term (long-term) 
earnings component of value, and that significant future returns are observed on strategies that 
exploit this finding. Thus, transient institutions not only exhibit strong preferences for more 
value in the near-term, these preferences translate into significant misv aluations. This finding 
supports the concerns that many managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base 
dominated by short-term-focused institutional investors. 
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TABLE 1 
Portfolio Characteristics of Institutional Investor Groups 
Panel A: Characteristics of Transient, Dedicated, and Quasi-indexer Institutions 
Factor 
PTURN 
BLOCK 
FSIZE 
I SIZE 
N 
where PTURN = 
BLOCK = 
FSIZE = 
ISIZE = 
N = 
Institutional Investor Groups 1 
TRA DED QIX 
Mean2 1.472 -0.228 -0.442 
Standard Dev . 0.819 0.691 0.488 
Mean -0.196 2.122 -0.292 
Standard Dev . 0.428 1.349 0.361 
Mean -0.248 -0.739 0.243 
Standard Dev . 0.894 1.104 0.858 
Mean 0.192 0.289 -0.102 
Standard Dev . 0.906 0.961 0.930 
3454 1785 10,696 
Portfolio Turnover Factor. Combination of 1) level of portfolio turnover and 2) percent of 
portfolio stocks held continuously for two years 
Block Size Factor. Combination of 1) weighted average size of institutional holdings in 
portfolio firms, 2) percent of portfolio held in large blocks (greater than 5% stakes), 
and 3) portfolio concentmtion ratio (total equity I number of stocks) 
Firm Size Preference Factor. Combination of 1) weighted average market value of equity 
of firms held by institution, 2) weighted average time listed of firm in portfolio, 3) 
percent of portfolio firms in S&P 500 
Institutional Size Factor. Combination of 1) total equity holdings of institution and 2) 
number of stocks in institutions' portfolio 
Number of institution-years in group 
Panel B: Interaction between I nstitutional Investor Type and Investment Horizon 
Dedicated 
Quasi-indexer 
Transient 
Total 
Banks 
537 
2,863 
300 
3,700 
Insurance Investment Pensions & 
Companies Advisers Endowments 
139 940 168 
748 5,855 1,224 
268 2,620 265 
1,155 9,415 1,657 
Total 
1,784 
10,690 
3,453 
15,927 
1 TRA =transient institutional investors, DED =dedicated institutional investors, and QIX =quasi-indexer 
institutional investors. Institutions are classified into these groups using the factor and cluster analysis approach 
described in Bushee (1998). First, prior research is used to calculate a number of variables that have been used to 
describe institutional investor trading behavior. Then, principal factor analysis is used to combine these variables 
into common factors that explain the shared variance among the original variables. Finally, a k-means cluster 
analysis is run on the factor scores from PTURN and BLOCK to obtain the fmal separation of institutional investors 
into groups (the I SIZE and FSIZE factors are not used in the cluster analysis but are reported for descriptive 
purposes. 
2 The numbers in the columns are factor scores for each of the listed factors. These scores are standardized to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across the whole distribution of institutional investors. 
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Variable 
BVC 
AXC 
TVC 
SIZE 
LEV 
SP500 
MAR 
BTA 
STD 
LIQ 
YIELD 
R&D 
TIME 
RATE 
SGR 
TIH 
BNK 
INS 
IA 
P&E 
DED 
QIX 
TRA 
TABLE2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. 
0.725 0.592 0.544 0.367 
-0.092 -0.012 0.299 -0.169 
0.488 0.464 0.328 0.275 
6.100 6.006 1.583 4.939 
0.239 0.227 0.159 0.123 
0.355 0.000 0.479 0.000 
0.003 -0.002 0.114 -0.038 
1.202 1.164 0.496 0.877 
0.102 0.100 0.026 0.080 
0.031 0.024 0.024 0.016 
0.025 0.022 0.022 0.006 
0.019 0.003 0.033 0.000 
18.070 19.143 7.597 12.622 
4.080 5.000 3.183 0.000 
0.027 0.050 0.209 -0.059 
0.358 0.381 0.230 0.174 
0.080 0.058 0.081 0.015 
0.037 0.011 0.065 0.001 
0.096 0.028 0.134 0.002 
0.124 0.068 0.141 0.002 
0.077 0.054 0.083 0.011 
0.203 0.201 0.145 0.081 
0.072 0.053 0.074 0.013 
Book value per share (60125) I Price (24)1 
Present value of forecasted abnormal earnings over next four years/ Price 
Present value of terminal value four-years ahead I Price 
Log of market value of equity (24 *25) 
Leverage, measured as debt-to-assets ((9+34)16) 
1 if firm listed on S&P 500, 0 otherwise 
Market-adjusted returns over prior year 
Market model beta estimated from up to 36 prior monthly returns 
Standard deviation of daily returns over prior year 
75th Pctl. 
0.920 
0.076 
0.688 
7.175 
0.331 
1.000 
0.021 
1.475 
0.125 
0.037 
0.036 
0.025 
23.705 
7.000 
0.129 
0.540 
0.118 
0.044 
0.143 
0.210 
0.113 
0.311 
0.106 
BVC = 
AXC= 
TVC= 
SIZE = 
LEV = 
SP500 = 
MAR= 
BTA= 
STD= 
LIQ = 
YIELD = 
R&D = 
Liquidity, measured as average monthly volume divided by shares outstanding over prior year 
Dividend yield (21124) 
R&D intensity (46112) 
TIME = Time listed, in years 
RATE = S&P common stock rating (9 = A+ ... 0 =not rated) 
SGR = Average sales growth over prior three years (12). 
TIH = Total shares held by institutional investors divided by total shares outstanding 
BNK/INSIIA/PNE = Percent of shares held by Banks I Insurance Companies I Investment Advisers I Pensions & 
Endowments 
DEDIQIX/TRA = Percent of shares held by Dedicated I Quasi-indexer I Transient institutions 
Compustat numbers are in parentheses. 
37 
BVC AXC TVC SIZE 
BVC2 1 -0.78 -0.20 -0.35 
AXC -0.77 1 0.33 0.31 
TVC -0.45 0.51 1 0.02 
SIZE -0.42 0.38 0.10 1 
LEV 0.15 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 
SP500 -0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.64 
MAR -0.41 0.41 0.11 0.26 
BTA -0.04 -0.09 0.12 -0.08 
STD 0.07 -0.18 0.12 -0.44 
LIQ -0.12 0.08 0.16 0.06 
YIELD 0.26 -0.12 -0.27 0.19 
R&D -0.06 0.01 0.09 0.13 
TIME 0.03 0.05 -0.18 0.32 
RATE -0.20 0.25 0.02 0.51 
SGR -0.21 0.21 0.13 0.19 
TIH -0.20 0.22 0.06 0.37 
BNK 0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.19 
INS -0.35 0.31 0.18 0.19 
IA -0.27 0.30 0.09 0.20 
PNE -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.40 
DED -0.06 0.10 0.01 0.12 
QIX -0.19 0.22 0.07 0.41 
TRA -0.25 0.19 0.05 0.28 
TABLE3 
Correlation Matrix1 
LEV SP500 MAR 
0.04 -0.06 -0.19 
-0.07 0.05 0.14 
0.06 -0.06 0.05 
-0.12 0.63 0.17 
1 -0.03 -0.09 
-0.02 1 -0.01 
-0.15 0.06 1 
0.05 -0.08 0.02 
0.17 -0.31 -0.10 
0.09 0.08 0.00 
-0.06 0.25 -0.03 
-0.20 0.14 0.00 
0.05 0.42 -0.04 
-0.13 0.44 0.06 
-0.02 0.04 0.12 
-0.12 0.25 0.06 
-0.05 -0.12 -0.06 
-0.10 -0.03 0.11 
-0.05 0.07 -0.02 
-0.14 0.35 0.03 
-0.04 0.07 -0.10 
-0.17 0.30 0.07 
-0.09 0.16 0.17 
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BTA 
-0.02 
-0.06 
0.09 
-0.11 
0.05 
-0.09 
0.08 
1 
0.62 
0.37 
-0.31 
0.08 
-0.18 
-0.19 
0.06 
0.02 
0.02 
0.11 
0.01 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.04 
0.11 
STD LIQ YIELD R&D 
0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 
-0.12 0.07 0.04 0.01 
0.16 0.17 0.00 0.09 
-0.41 0.02 0.02 0.02 
0.18 0.01 0.11 -0.08 
-0.29 -0.01 0.05 0.00 
0.03 0.20 -0.01 0.02 
0.59 0.37 -0.03 0.14 
1 0.47 -0.05 0.10 
0.45 1 -0.02 0.21 
-0.50 -0.35 1 -0.02 
0.00 0.16 -0.03 1 
-0.32 -0.08 0.27 0.09 
-0.45 -0.11 0.24 0.10 
-0.01 0.13 -0.11 0.00 
-0.21 0.19 0.07 0.17 
0.03 0.00 0.08 0.02 
0.05 0.22 -0.19 0.09 
-0.12 0.13 -0.10 0.09 
-0.24 0.04 0.23 0.16 
-0.10 0.07 0.02 0.08 
-0.29 0.08 0.16 0.17 
-0.04 0.30 -0.05 0.16 
Tll\IIE RATE 
BVC -0.01 -0.17 
AXC 0.03 0.17 
TVC -0.16 -0.05 
SIZE 0.30 0.49 
LEV 0.01 -0.12 
SP500 0.40 0.43 
MAR -0.09 -0.02 
BTA -0.21 -0.19 
STD -0.31 -0.40 
LIQ -0.23 -0.14 
YIELD 0.06 0.01 
R&D -0.06 -0.02 
Tll\IIE 1 0.44 
RATE 0.40 1 
SGR 0.04 0.19 
TIH 0.24 0.29 
BNK -0.01 -0.07 
INS 0.03 0.10 
IA 0.22 0.22 
PNE 0.20 0.34 
DED 0.15 0.15 
QIX 0.27 0.36 
TRA 0.10 0.12 
SGR 
-0.13 
0.13 
0.04 
0.17 
0.02 
0.04 
0.08 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.16 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.05 
0.15 
1 
0.12 
-0.08 
0.15 
0.14 
0.12 
0.05 
0.12 
0.13 
TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix 
TIH BNK INS 
-0.19 0.06 -0.21 
0.19 -0.03 0.16 
-0.01 -0.07 0.09 
0.35 -0.21 0.09 
-0.12 -0.02 -0.03 
0.23 -0.14 -0.10 
0.09 -0.08 0.33 
0.01 0.02 0.17 
-0.20 0.01 0.17 
0.15 -0.03 0.37 
0.01 0.02 -0.03 
0.04 -0.03 0.09 
0.21 -0.01 -0.10 
0.30 -0.09 -0.01 
0.11 -0.10 0.12 
1 0.42 0.46 
0.49 1 0.03 
0.64 0.33 1 
0.67 0.18 0.64 
0.67 0.42 0.33 
0.73 0.53 0.54 
0.88 0.41 0.55 
0.73 0.48 0.60 
1 Pearson correlations are above the diagonal. Spearman correlations are below the diagonal. 
2 See table 1 for variable definitions. 
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IA PNE DED QIX TRA 
-0.21 -0.05 -0.02 -0.18 -0.20 
0.20 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.15 
0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
0.34 0.36 0.05 0.40 0.22 
-0.03 -0.12 0.01 -0.16 -0.06 
0.18 0.38 0.03 0.30 0.10 
0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.21 
0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.15 
-0.17 -0.25 -0.07 -0.29 0.03 
0.14 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.31 
-0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.03 
0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 
0.25 0.18 0.11 0.26 0.02 
0.27 0.32 0.11 0.36 0.07 
0.11 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.12 
0.58 0.57 0.62 0.87 0.63 
-0.12 0.20 0.44 0.26 0.29 
0.37 -0.07 0.33 0.27 0.47 
1 -0.07 0.34 0.56 0.32 
0.27 1 0.27 0.58 0.30 
0.56 0.48 1 0.32 0.17 
0.62 0.69 0.52 1 0.39 
0.52 0.53 0.44 0.58 1 
TABLE4 
Regression of i nstitutional Ownership on Decomposition of Firm Value and Control Variables 
PIH 1 = Yo+ y1 BVC 1 + y2 AXC1 + y3 TVC1 + y4 SIZE1 + y5 LEV1 +y6 SP5001 + y7 MAR 1 + y8 BETA1 + 1 y9 STD 1 +y10 LIQ 1 + y11 YIELD1 + y12 R & D 1 + y13 TIME 1 + y14 RA TE 1 + y15 SGR 1 + £ 1 
Pane/ A : Terminal value forecasted four-years ahead 
Institutional OwnershiE Variables2 
TIH DED QIX TRA BNK lA IN S P&E 
INT3 0.353 0.122 0.215 0.013 0.152 0.074 0.044 0.020 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.0 12) (0.045) (0.000) (0.328) (0.001) (0.278) 
BVC -0.030 -0.001 -0.018 -0.009 0.005 -0.021 -0.021 0.009 
(0.047) (0.426) (0.1 04) (0.000) (0.11 0) (0.065) (0.001) (0.138) 
AXC 0.029 0.007 0.0 11 0.012 0.026 -0.014 -0.01 1 0.022 
(0.181) (0.332) (0.174) (0.022) (0.000) (0.017) (0.004) (0.231) 
TVC -0.031 -0.0 13 -0.001 -0.017 -0.021 -0.002 -0.005 0.004 
(0.113) (0.021) (0.466) (0.032) (0.011) (0.254) (0.407) (0.277) 
SIZE 0.009 -0.004 0.006 0.006 -0.010 0.005 0.000 0.017 
(0.162) (0.239) (0.061) (0.000) (0.083) (0.1 66) (0.499) (0.059) 
LEV -0.096 -0.002 -0.090 -0.004 -0.012 -0.014 -0.006 -0.042 
(0.000) (0.437) (0.000) (0.208) (0.115) (0 .1 48) (0.053) (0.001) 
SP500 0.024 0.002 0.027 -0.003 -0.013 0.017 -0.012 0.039 
(0.004) (0.231) (0.002) (0.054) (0.000) (0.245) (0.126) (0.000) 
MAR -0.005 -0.035 -0.151 0.174 -0.031 0.039 0.123 -0. 173 
(0.480) (0.029) (0.095) (0.033) (0.265) (0.040) (0.004) (0.004) 
BETA 0.073 0.010 0.047 0.017 O.Ql5 0.016 0.007 0.034 
(0.005) (0.0 15) (0.002) (0.077) (0.000) (0.013) (0.1 09) (0.0 16) 
STD -2.065 -0.406 -1.498 -0.161 -0.398 -0.557 -0.022 -1.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0. 169) (0.008) (0.285) (0.422) (0.000) 
LIQ 1.221 0.009 0.366 0.840 0.353 0.235 0.332 0.281 
(0.004) (0.473) (0.1 74) (0.000) (0.047) (0.1 58) (0.138) (0.087) 
YIELD 0.341 0.132 0.342 -0.105 0.111 -0.164 -0. 177 0.527 
(0.0 10) (0.008) (0.010) (0.000) (0.118) (0.019) (0.001) (0.047) 
R&D 0.715 0.131 0.349 0.218 0.097 0.141 0.116 0.396 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.1 77) (0.001) (0.000) (0.0 14) 
TIME 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.026) (0.000) (0.009) (0.017) (0.1 28) (0.482) (0.002) 
RATE 0.002 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
(0.001) (0.1 35) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000) (0.1 92) (0.209) (0.040) 
SGR -0.014 -0.009 -0.004 0.000 -0.011 -0.002 0.005 0.000 
(0.038) (0.001) (0.326) (0.431) (0.008) (0.239) (0.118) (0.467) 
Avg. Adj. R2 0.20 0.05 0.26 0.21 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.30 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Regression of i nstitutional Ownership on Decomposition afFirm Value and Control Variables 
Panel B: Terminal value forecasted one-year ahead 
TIH DED QIX TRA BNK lA IN S P&E 
INT 0.352 0.123 0.214 0.012 0.152 0.073 0.043 0.020 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.056) (0.000) (0.285) (0.001) (0.275) 
BVC -0.027 -0.001 -0.014 -0.010 0.005 -0.020 -0.019 0.0 11 
(0.049) (0.391) (0.146) (0.000) (0.1 07) (0.065) (0.001) (0.093) 
AXC1 0.100 0.021 0.046 0.034 0.068 -0.021 -0.007 0.044 
(0.083) (0.237) (0.074) (0.0 10) (0.001) (0.066) (0.408) (0.237) 
TVC1 -0.022 -0.010 0.000 -0.011 -0.013 -0.004 -0.006 0.007 
(0.094) (0.009) (0.483) (0.054) (0.0 12) (0 .1 00) (0.377) (0.033) 
SIZE 0.009 -0.004 0.006 0.006 -0.010 0.005 0.000 0.017 
(0.182) (0.237) (0.068) (0.000) (0.080) (0 .1 62) (0.483) (0.062) 
LEV -0.094 -0.002 -0.088 -0.004 -0.010 -0.015 -0.006 -0.041 
(0.000) (0.450) (0.000) (0.255) (0.1 57) (0 .1 27) (0.064) (0.001) 
SP500 0.025 0.002 0.027 -0.003 -0.012 0.017 -0.012 0.040 
(0.005) (0.201) (0.002) (0.061) (0.000) (0.246) (0.114) (0.000) 
MA R -0.007 -0.033 -0.156 0.177 -0.029 0.036 0.121 -0. 175 
(0.472) (0.022) (0.092) (0.031) (0.281) (0.045) (0.005) (0.003) 
BETA 0.071 0.009 0.046 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.007 0.033 
(0.004) (0.0 14) (0.002) (0.081) (0.000) (0.014) (0.105) (0.0 15) 
STD -2.068 -0.411 -1.489 -0.169 -0.404 -0.553 -0.018 -1.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.008) (0.273) (0.432) (0.000) 
LIQ 1.233 0.014 0.367 0.845 0.359 0.233 0.334 0.284 
(0.004) (0.459) (0.182) (0.000) (0.040) (0 .1 66) (0.156) (0.091) 
YIELD 0.345 0.136 0.333 -0.096 0.123 -0.170 -0. 182 0.522 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.0 12) (0.000) (0.097) (0.018) (0.001) (0.050) 
R&D 0.718 0.130 0.356 0.214 0.094 0.142 0.118 0.400 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.1 82) (0.001) (0.000) (0.0 17) 
TIME 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.022) (0.000) (0.009) (0.017) (0.1 32) (0.495) (0.002) 
RATE 0.002 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
(0.002) (0.1 35) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000) (0.1 83) (0.234) (0.038) 
SGR -0.014 -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 -0.011 -0.002 0.006 0.000 
(0.041) (0.001) (0.327) (0.401) (0.007) (0.252) (0.103) (0.465) 
Avg. Adj. R2 0.20 0.05 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.30 
Regressions are run yearly and mean coefficients are reported. The p-values in parentheses are based on a 
standard error derived from the distribution of these coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation. 
2 The PIH variable is replaced in the regression by the other variables indicated in the top row, where TIH =total 
institutional ownership, DED =dedicated, QIX = quasi-indexer, TRA =transient, BNK= banks, IA = investment 
advisers, INS = insurance companies, and P&E =pensions and endowments 
3 See table 1 for variable definitions. AXC1 (TVC1) is the near-term earnings (terminal value) computed with the 
horizon set at one-year ahead. 
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TABLE S 
Regression ofThree-Year Changes in Institutional Ownership on Three-Year Changes in the 
Decomposition afFirm Value and in Control Variables 
CPU\ =Yo+ y1CBV~ + y2CAX~ + y3CTVG + y4CSIZ~ + y5CLEv; + y6CSP5001 + Y7CMA~ + y8CBETA + 1 y9C STD1 + y10CLIQ + y11CYIELQ + y12CR & D1 + y13 TIMI;_3 + y14CRA T~ + y15CSG~ + £1 
Panel A: Terminal value forecasted f our-years ahead 
Institutional OwnershiE Variables2 
CTIH CDED CQIX CTRA CBNK CIA CINS CP&E 
INT3 0.060 0.015 0.039 0.007 0.000 0.041 0.018 0.001 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.102) (0.488) (0.046) (0.009) (0.472) 
CBVC 0.002 0 000 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0 002 -0 003 0.006 
(0.3 13) (0.495) (0.067) (0.231) (0.095) (0.264) (0.150) (0.109) 
CAXC 0.021 0.003 0.003 0.017 0.022 -0.019 -0.003 0.017 
(0.129) (0.230) (0.359) (0.050) (0.013) (0.053) (0.122) (0.139) 
CTVC -0.002 0.000 0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 0.014 
(0.382) (0.492) (0.003) (0.043) (0 .1 17) (0.1 53) (0.222) (0.011) 
CSIZE 0.038 -0.005 0.016 0.021 -0.006 0.024 0.018 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.245) (0.004) (0.000) (0 .1 89) (0.008) (0.0 12) (0.428) 
CLEV -0.020 0.008 -0.033 0.006 0.006 0.033 0.015 -0.059 
(0.129) (0.254) (0.004) (0.257) (0.224) (0.119) (0.003) (0.000) 
CSP500 -0.014 -0.004 0.008 -0.015 -0.023 0.021 -0.015 0.010 
(0.005) (0.356) (0.059) (0.022) (0.047) (0.087) (0.001) (0.380) 
CMA R -0.038 -0.075 -0.070 0.1 12 -0.044 0.033 0.061 -0.099 
(0.154) (0.043) (0.030) (0.006) (0.0 13) (0. 189) (0.001) (0.026) 
CBETA 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.002 
(0.037) (0.028) (0.1 42) (0.327) (0.407) (0.002) (0.245) (0.3 16) 
CSTD -0.526 -0.246 -0.364 0.026 -0.130 -0.195 0.053 -0.302 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.395) (0.081) (0.190) (0.060) (0.007) 
CLIQ 0.476 0.076 0. 171 0.212 0.002 0.088 -0.031 0.397 
(0.010) (0.253) (0.3 15) (0.233) (0.495) (0.248) (0.407) (0.006) 
CYIELD -0.017 0.051 0.035 -0.109 -0.114 -0.110 0.080 0.220 
(0.472) (0.319) (0.264) (0.135) (0.323) (0.194) (0.033) (0.008) 
CR&D -0.516 -0.254 -0.311 0.015 -0.265 0.068 -0.109 -0. 182 
(0.113) (0.2 19) (0.037) (0.441) (0.226) (0.401) (0.169) (0.161) 
TIME 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.001 
(0.262) (0.052) (0.304) (0.325) (0.028) (0.078) (0.004) (0.254) 
CRATE 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
(0.353) (0.1 38) (0.338) (0.094) (0.277) (0.256) (0.214) (0.194) 
CSGR 0.030 0.008 0.016 0.003 0.014 0.014 -0.002 0.000 
(0.014) (0.278) (0.035) (0.428) (0.017) (0.027) (0.402) (0.495) 
Avg. Adj . R2 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.09 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Regression ofThree-Year Changes in Institutional Ownership on Three-Year Changes in the 
Decomposition afFirm Value and in Control Variables 
PanelB: Terminal value forecasted one-year ahead 
CTIH CDED CQIX CTRA CBNK CIA CINS CP&E 
INT 0.059 0.015 0.039 0.007 0.000 0.041 O.Ql8 0.002 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.115) (0.489) (0.045) (0.010) (0.468) 
CBVC 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.008 
(0.100) (0.476) (0.006) (0.408) (0.118) (0.393) (0.165) (0.082) 
CAXC1 0.058 0.006 0.032 0.023 0.045 -0.024 -0.003 0.037 
(0.022) (0.324) (0.049) (0.0 19) (0.032) (0.085) (0.325) (0.054) 
CTVC1 0.001 0.000 0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 0.013 
(0.452) (0.458) (0.058) (0.276) (0.346) (0.064) (0.300) (0.015) 
CSIZE 0.037 -0.005 0.014 0.022 -0.006 0.024 0.018 -0.003 
(0.000) (0.247) (0.007) (0.000) (0.166) (0.009) (0.023) (0.311) 
CLEV -0.017 0.009 -0.031 0.006 0.008 0.033 0.014 -0.057 
(0.169) (0.244) (0.004) (0.250) (0.175) (0.148) (0.003) (0.000) 
CSP500 -0.014 -0.004 0.008 -0.014 -0.023 0.021 -0.015 0.010 
(0.005) (0.361) (0.056) (0.022) (0.045) (0.091) (0.001) (0.380) 
CMAR -0.025 -0.072 -0.063 0.1 15 -0.036 0.033 0.061 -0.093 
(0.211) (0.043) (0.028) (0.005) (0.028) (0.180) (0.001) (0.047) 
CBETA 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.003 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.068) (0.369) (0.380) (0.002) (0.237) (0.296) 
CSTD -0.530 -0.247 -0.375 0.031 -0.132 -0.194 0.052 -0.310 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.366) (0.067) (0.184) (0.065) (0.006) 
CLIQ 0.476 0.075 0.164 0.218 0.007 0.078 -0.029 0.391 
(0.009) (0.256) (0.327) (0.230) (0.481) (0.265) (0.411) (0.007) 
CYIELD -0.009 0.053 0.039 -0.105 -0.107 -0. 114 0.084 0.226 
(0.484) (0.310) (0.244) (0.142) (0.332) (0. 182) (0.027) (0.007) 
CR&D -0.506 -0.252 -0.292 0.005 -0.259 0.082 -0.1 12 -0.184 
(0.114) (0.214) (0.040) (0.479) (0.238) (0.379) (0.164) (0.160) 
TIME 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.001 
(0.294) (0.043) (0.310) (0.344) (0.049) (0.080) (0.003) (0.257) 
CRATE 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
(0.323) (0.141) (0.302) (0.097) (0.246) (0.277) (0.218) (0.189) 
CSGR 0.028 0.009 0.013 0.003 0.013 0.013 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.015) (0.266) (0.078) (0.399) (0.023) (0.010) (0.415) (0.429) 
Avg. Adj. R2 0.06 0.03 0.04 0. 13 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.09 
Regressions are nm yearly and mean coefficients are reported. The p-values in parentheses are based on a 
standard error derived from the distribution of these coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation. 
2 The CPIH variable is a three-year change in holdings. The PIH variable is replaced in the regression by the other 
variables indicated in the top row, where TIH =total institutional ownership, DED =dedicated, QIX = quasi-
indexer, TRA = transient, BN K= banks, IA = investment advisers, INS = insurance companies, and P&E = pensions 
and endowments 
3 Variables are three-year changes in the variables defined in table 1. AXC1 (TVC1) is the near-term earnings 
(terminal value) computed with the horizon set at one-year ahead. 
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TABLE 6 
Regression of Price on the Decomposition of Firm Value Interacted with Indicators for High Levels of Institutional Ownership 
P1 = OQ +a1DPI~ + a2 BV1 +a3(BV*DPIH)1 + a4PVA~ +a5(PVAX*DPIH)1 +a6PVTV1 +a7 (PVTV*DPIH)1 +1Jit 1 
Panel A : Regression without Institutional Ownership Interactions 
Horizon INT BV PXAX PVTV 
4 year ahead 3.766 0.988 1.206 0.684 
p-value (=0)2 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p-value (=1) (0.462) (0.032) (0.000) 
1 year ahead 4.073 1.014 2.571 0.673 
p-value (=0) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
p-value (=1) (0.455) (0.003) (0.000) 
Panel B: Regression with Interactions of Institutional Ownership classified by Investment Horizon 
BV* BV* BV* 
Horizon INT DTRA DQIX DDED BV DTRA DQIX DDED 
4 year ahead 3.676 7.205 1.995 -1.941 0.988 -0.217 0.089 0.003 
p-value (=0) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.091) (0.000) (0.076) (0.014) (0.487) 
p-value (=1) (0.461) (0.104) (0.135) (0.451) 
1 year ahead 4.017 6.950 1.646 -2.048 0.996 -0.199 0.109 0.065 
p-value (=0) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.069) (0.000) (0.098) (0.010) (0.235) 
p-value (=1) (0.484) (0.136) (0.070) (0.240) 
PVAX* PVAX* PVAX* PVTV* PVTV* PVTV* 
Horizon PVAX DTRA DQIX DDED PVTV DTRA DQIX DDED 
4 year ahead 1.182 0.394 0.311 -0.093 0.654 -0.134 -0.036 0.116 
p-value (=0) (0.000) (0.086) (0.019) (0.396) (0.000) (0.032) (0.228) (0.180) 
p-value (=1) (0. 129) (0.024) (0.004) (0.293) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) 
1 year ahead 2.383 1.936 1.057 0.015 0.655 -0.119 -0.023 0.058 
p-value (=0) (0.000) (0.006) (0.028) (0.492) (0.000) (0.036) (0.310) (0.210) 
p-value (=1) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
Regression of Price on the Decomposition of Firm Value Interacted with Indicators for High Levels of Institutional Ownership 
Panel C: Regression with Interactions of Institutional Ownership classified by Fiduciary Standards 
BV* BV* BV* BV* 
Horizon INT DBNK DIIA DINS DPNE BV DBNK DIA DINS DP&E 
4 year ahead 4.740 1.519 0.507 0.576 1.436 0.983 -0.115 0.027 -0.088 0.004 
p-value (=0) (0.000) (0.227) (0.354) (0.380) (0.229) (0.000) (0.216) (0.424) (0.055) (0.472) 
p-value (=1) (0.458) (0.143) (0.480) (0.239) (0.418) 
1 year ahead 4.943 1.452 0.475 0.724 1.114 0.980 -0.112 0.206 -0.064 0.043 
p-value (=0) (0.000) (0.268) (0.405) (0.375) (0.274) (0.000) (0.214) (0.130) (0.168) (0.211) 
p-value (=1) (0.436) (0.165) (0.195) (0.306) (0.412) 
PVAX* PVAX* PVAX* PVAX* PVTV* PVTV* PVTV* PVTV* 
Horizon PVAX DBNK DIA DINS DP&E PVTV DBNK DIA DINS DP&E 
4 year ahead 1.310 -0.038 -0.180 -0.149 -0.229 0.563 -0.083 0.212 0.141 0.005 
p-value (=0) (0.000) (0.428) (0.223) (0.217) (0.196) (0.000) (0.233) (0.037) (0.019) (0.469) 
p-value (=1) (0.035) (0.040) (0.305) (0.358) (0.293) (0.000) (0.003) (0.021) (0.008) (0.000) 
1 year ahead 2.632 0.036 1.913 -0.152 -0.254 0.594 -0.084 0.031 0.105 -0.042 
p-value (=0) (0.000) (0.468) (0.007) (0.365) (0.408) (0.000) (0.273) (0.319) (0.020) (0.323) 
p-value (=1) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
1 See table 1 for variable definitions. BV, PV AX, and PVTV are the undeflated values of B VC, AXC, and TVC, respectively. DPIH equals one if institutional 
ownership is in the top quintile, zero otherwise. The PIH variable is replaced by the other variables indicated in the top row, where OED = dedicated, QIX = 
quasi-indexer, TRA =transient, BNK= banks, IA =investment advisers, INS= insurance companies, and P&E =pensions and endowments. 
2 Regressions are run yearly and mean coefficients are repmted. The p-values in parentheses are based on a standard error derived from the distribution of these 
coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation. "P-value (=0)" represents the p-value that tests whether the mean coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
"P-value (=1)" represents the p-value that tests whether the mean coefficient is significantly different from one; for interaction variables, this test is whether the 
sum of the interacted and uninteracted coefficients is different from one. 
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TABLE 7 
Regress ion of Future Size-Adjusted Returns on Ranked Values of Firm Value Components interacted with Institutional Ownership 
CAR(I) 1 = {30 + {J1RBVC 1 + {32 (RBVC * RPIH) 1 + {J3 RAXC 1 + {3 4 (RAXC * RPIH )1 + fJ5 RTVC 1 + {J6 (RTVC * RPIH )1 + 1 
fJ7 RSIZE 1 + fJ8 RBETA 1 + fJ9 REP1 + ~jt 
Panel A : Regression without Institutional Ownership Interactions 
Fom-year Horizon One-year Horizon 
RBVC RAXC RTVC RBVCl RAXCl RTVCl 
CARl 0.022 0.043 -0.036 0.095 0.107 -0.021 
(0.190) (0.129) (0.156) (0.003) (0.026) (0.246) 
CAR2 0.047 0.076 -0.083 0.227 0.215 -0.036 
(0.178) (0.034) (0.072) (0.002) (0.006) (0.230) 
CAR3 0.048 0.083 -0.155 0.317 0.301 -0.103 
(0.279) (0.085) (0.024) (0.003) (0.005) (0.039) 
CAR4 0. 149 0.128 -0.193 0.504 0.435 -0.114 
(0.069) (0.047) (0.026) (0.003) (0.002) (0.045) 
CARS 0.282 0. 155 -0.208 0.653 0.489 -0.111 
(0.015) (0.063) (0.018) (0.002) (0.000) (0.072) 
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TABLE 7 (Continued) 
Regress ion of Future Size-Adjusted Returns on Ranked Values of Firm Value Components interacted with Institutional Ownership 
Panel B: ReJ;ression with Interactions of Institutional Ownership classified by Investment Horizon 
Four-year Horizon 
RBVC* RBVC* RBVC* RAXC* RAXC* RAXC* RTVC* RTVC* RTVC* 
RBVC RTRA RQIX RDED RAXC RTRA RQIX RDED RTVC RTRA RQIX RDED 
CARl -0.024 0.133 0.001 -O.OOS 0.044 -O.OS3 -O.OS3 0.107 -0.06S 0.068 0.080 -0.078 
(0.214) (0.071) (0.492) (0.447) (0.171) (0.190) (0.29S) (O.lOS) (0.191) (0.229) (0.166) (0.210) 
CAR2 -0.007 0.103 0.117 -0.018 0.130 -O.l4S -0.090 O.lSO -0.203 0.22S 0.110 -0.069 
(0.463) (O.llS) (0.009) (0.329) (0.010) (0.033) (0.319) (0.031) (0.016) (0.036) (O.lSO) (0.186) 
CAR3 -0.063 0.090 0.212 O.OS7 0.167 -0.130 -0.214 0.208 -0.320 0.260 0.281 -0. 163 
(0.282) (0.209) (0.008) (0.201) (0.020) (0.238) (0.26S) (0.03S) (0.021) (0.031) (O.OS7) (O.OSS) 
CAR4 -0.032 0.138 0.36S O.OS7 0.227 -0.12S -O.lS9 O.lS2 -0.371 0.247 0.2S9 -0.089 
(0.431) (0.147) (0.010) (0.2SO) (0.023) (0.3S7) (0.3SO) (O.lSS) (0.006) (0. 181) (0.134) (0.226) 
CARS -0.016 0.282 0.489 0.080 0.271 -O.l4S -0.280 0.289 -0.390 0.23S 0.389 -0.196 
(0.477) (0.077) (0.061) (0.180) (0.03S) (0.368) (0.317) (0.122) (0.006) (0.2S6) (0.177) (0.242) 
One-year Horizon 
RBVCl* RBVCl* RBVCl* RAXCl* RAXCl* RAXCl* RTVCl* RTVCl * RTVCl* 
RBVCl RTRA RQIX RDED RAXCl RTRA RQIX RDED RTVCl RTRA RQIX RDED 
CARl 0.044 0.127 -0.017 -0.006 0.112 -0.041 -0.078 0.096 -0.072 0.064 0.110 -0.061 
(0.036) (0.074) (0.32S) (0.413) (0.038) (0.249) (0.220) (0.114) (0.163) (0.199) (0.070) (0.247) 
CAR2 O.lS6 0.100 0.09S -0.02S 0.243 -0.132 -0.081 0.1S3 -0.160 0.217 0. 104 -O.OS4 
(0.018) (0.138) (0.020) (0.286) (0.02S) (0.048) (0.336) (0.016) (0.019) (O.OS2) (0.138) (0.282) 
CAR3 0.201 0.07S 0.186 O.QlS 0.323 -0.128 -0.121 0.211 -0.260 0.281 0.177 -0.117 
(O.OS8) (0.267) (0.012) (0.412) (0.039) (0.2Sl) (0.373) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.170) (0.136) 
CAR4 0.32S 0.089 0.323 0.020 0.470 -0.173 -0.028 O.lS9 -0.298 0.334 0.118 -0.04S 
(O.OS9) (0.216) (0.008) (0.404) (0.011) (0.2S7) (0.476) (0.062) (0.006) (0.023) (0.302) (0.32S) 
CARS 0.380 0.167 0.447 0.036 O.S42 -0.189 -0.112 0.242 -0.317 0.366 0.182 -0.094 
(0.071) (0.124) (0.037) (0.336) (0.002) (0.282) (0.413) (0.08S) (0.042) (0.106) (0.2S l ) (0.319) 
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TABLE 7 (Continued) 
Regress ion of Future Size-Adjusted Returns on Ranked Values of Firm Value Components interacted with Institutional Ownership 
Panel D: Regression with Interactions of Institutional Ownership classtfied by Fiduciary Standards 
Four-year Horizon 
RBVC* RBVC* RBVC* RBVC* RAXC* RAXC* RAXC* RAXC* RTVC* RTVC* RTVC* RTVC* 
RBVC RBNK RIA RINS RP&E RAXC RBNK RIA RINS RP&E RTVC RBNK RIA RINS RP&E 
CARl -0.007 0.047 0.035 -0.028 0.026 0.049 0.061 0.077 -0.182 0.039 -0.082 -0.025 -0.084 0.243 -0.026 
(0.401) (0.119) (0.212) (0.139) (0.358) (0.113) (0.256) (0.201) (0.085) (0.382) (0.106) (0.421) (0.167) (0.026) (0.443) 
CAR2 0.000 0.082 -0.010 0.018 0.071 0.124 -0.023 0.090 -0.284 0.130 -0.210 0.040 0.042 0.276 -0.074 
(0.498) (0.071) (0.443) (0.325) (0.122) (0.027) (0.447) (0.263) (0.058) (0.266) (0.011) (0.409) (0.408) (0.055) (0.366) 
CAR3 -0.106 0.069 0.044 0.110 0.184 0.145 -0.176 0.203 -0.338 0.215 -0.277 0.240 -0.105 0.292 -0.155 
(0. 171) (0.141) (0.368) (0.115) (0.019) (0.019) (0.294) (0.145) (0.033) (0.303) (0.003) (0.286) (0.288) (0.066) (0.358) 
CAR4 -0.081 0.287 -0.018 0. 125 0.214 0.184 -0.198 0.262 -0.411 0.283 -0.301 0.252 -0.097 0.327 -0.217 
(0.347) (0.010) (0.427) (0.169) (0.023) (0.025) (0.301) (0.115) (0.033) (0.321) (0.000) (0.255) (0.359) (0.132) (0.349) 
CARS -0.101 0.441 -0.138 0.255 0.398 0.246 -0.269 0.269 -0.559 0.440 -0.312 0.272 0.070 0.373 -0.447 
(0.369) (0.008) (0.171) (0.018) (0.005) (0.039) (0.191) (0.200) (0.056) (0.274) (0.002) (0.193) (0.421) (0.179) (0.260) 
One-year Horizon 
RBVCl * RBVC1 * RBVC1 * RBVC1 * RAXCl* RAXCl* RAXCl* RAXC1* RTVCl* RTVCl* RTVC1* RTVCl* 
RBVCl RBNK RIA RINS RP&E RAXCl RBNK RIA RINS RP&E RTVCl RBNK RIA RINS RP&E 
CARl 0.069 0.029 0.006 -0.007 0.031 0.106 0.077 0.071 -0.154 0.009 -0.075 -0.028 -0.051 0.203 -0.004 
(0.010) (0.102) (0.453) (0.362) (0.295) (0.041) (0.189) (0.267) (0. 104) (0.475) (0.132) (0.387) (0.285) (0.031) (0.491) 
CAR2 0.181 0.060 -0.064 0.066 0.069 0.229 0.009 0.134 -0.269 0.096 -0.154 0.026 0.045 0.244 -0.050 
(0.024) (0.083) (0.220) (0.026) (0.079) (0.022) (0.475) (0.148) (0.113) (0.323) (0.007) (0.420) (0.364) (0.102) (0.398) 
CAR3 0 .1 97 0.073 -0.040 0 .1 37 0.133 0.289 -0.061 0.264 -0.344 0.176 -0.211 0.122 -0.081 0.307 -0.097 
(0.088) (0.053) (0.372) (0.032) (0.083) (0.028) (0.421) (0.107) (0.048) (0.334) (0.002) (0.350) (0.355) (0.057) (0.389) 
CAR4 0.311 0.266 -0.101 0.149 0.148 0.390 -0.120 0.325 -0.418 0.316 -0.201 0.188 -0.064 0.341 -0.231 
(0.085) (0.052) (0.146) (0.104) (0.183) (0.005) (0.360) (0.095) (0.055) (0.305) (0.024) (0.277) (0.419) (0.114) (0.3 12) 
CARS 0.333 0.425 -0.192 0.249 0.249 0.457 -0.202 0.407 -0.590 0.447 -0.200 0.219 0.000 0.433 -0.390 
(0.125) (0.048) (0.075) (0.040) (0.088) (0.001) (0.280) (0.109) (0.077) (0.280) (0.149) (0.270) (0.500) (0.175) (0.261) 
1 See table 1 for variable definitions. CAR1-CAR6 are the buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns 1-6 years after the Value Line forecast release. RBV, RAXC, RTVC, RSIZE, 
RBETA, and REP are the scaled decile rank values of BVC, AXC, TVC, SIZE, BETA, and EP respectively. RPIH is the quintile of total institutional ownership. The PIH 
variable is replaced by the other variables indicated in the top row, where DED = dedicated, QIX = quasi-indexer, TRA = transient, BNK= banks, lA = investment advisers, 
INS = insurance companies, and P&E =pensions and endowments. Regressions are run yearly and mean coefficients are reported. The p-values in parentheses are based 
on a standard error derived from the distribution of these coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation. 
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